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The capital structure of firms that cannot hedge continuously is affected by the agency costs and the 
moral-hazard implicit in the contracts they establish with stockholders and customers. It is demonstrated in this 
paper that then an optimal level of capital exists, which is characterised in terms of the actuarial prices of the 
involved agreements. The capital principle so obtained extends the classic theoretical framework, sustained by 
the well-known proposition of Modigliani and Miller and the model of deposit insurance of Robert Merton, at 
the time that naturally integrates the financial and actuarial theoretical settings. 
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1. Introduction 
A model will be presented to characterise the level of capital demanded by firms that access to 
capital markets where hedging is restricted to some extent. 
At the empirical level, the implied capital principle shows advantages over other principles 
found in the literature. Firstly, it is founded on economic fundamentals. Secondly, since it is expressed 
in terms of the quantile function of the underlying risk, it can be applied to any kind of probability 
distributions and hence, it is suitable both to finance and insurance applications. The quantile function 
is actually well-known by researchers and practitioners and it has been recommended by the Basel 
Committee (2004). 
 
2. Economic Capital in Opaque Institutions 
Financial institutions maintain cash provisions, in the form of capital, to guarantee that their 
contracted liabilities will be honoured at the end of the investment period. 
Several types of capital are distinguished in the literature. Thus, on the one hand, cash capital 
represents  a  balance  required  to  execute  transactions,  while  working  capital  additionally  includes 
operational expenses [see Williams et al., (2002)]. On the other hand, the term regulatory capital refers 
to  a  balance  defined  according  to  some  accounting  standard  [as  in  Basel,  (2004)],  while  equity 
corresponds  to  the  portion  of  reserves  provided  by  shareholders.  Finally,  many  authors  speak  of 
economic  or  risk  capital  when  some  particular  criterion,  based  on  economic  or  statistical 
considerations, is proposed. 
In the lines with Merton (1974, 1977), the demand for capital will be corresponded to a demand 
for  deposit  insurance  in  this  paper.  Accordingly,  the  terms  economic  and  risk  capital  will  be 
indistinctly used to refer to the smallest amount required to insure the value of the portfolio of net 
assets  D A X − = ,  where  A  and  D  respectively  denote  the  market  values  of  the  portfolios  of 
outstanding assets and liabilities. 
In this context, the difference between economic and equity capitals represents a balance that is 
supplied by managers in attention to some solvency requirement. 
Three  main  components  of  the  capital  structure  can  then  be  distinguished:  a  net  liability 
contracted with customers, an amount of equity supplied by shareholders and a cash balance provided 
by managers. Since the economic capital is equal to the sum of the last two components, the problem 
of  capital  allocation  can  be  roughly  corresponded  to  the  determination  of  the  proportions  of  the 
portfolio of assets that are funded by means of internal and external debt. 
Holding capital imposes an opportunity cost on firms because these funds could be alternatively 
employed on profitable investments. Such costs lead financial institutions to prefer external debt and 
accordingly demand as less capital as possible. Journal of Applied Economic Sciences 
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In fact, in a seminal paper, Modigliani and Miller (1958) claim that, if at any moment firms can 
borrow and lend any amount of capital at a single interest rate, they can adjust their balance sheets 
whenever  is  needed  and  hence  cash  provisions  impose  a  cost  without  any  benefit.  Then  rational 
decision-makers (who maximise value) should demand no capital at all. 
More specifically, Merton (1997) states that the presence of credit-sensitive customers obliges 
opaque institutions (whose investment activities are not fully observed by outsiders) to rely on a third-
party guarantor, who agrees to honour the outstanding liabilities when bankruptcy is declared. The 
presence of credit-sensitive customers thereby increases external controls and monitoring due to the 
moral-hazard implicit in the administration of deposits [see also Ross, (1989)]. 
In this context, the market values of equity and debt can be respectively corresponded to the 
values of a call and a put option on the value of assets, with exercise price equal to the value of debt, 
which  implies  that  the  market  value  of  the  firm  (or  the  market  value  of  the  assets'  portfolio)  is 
independent of the  capital  structure,  as  predicted  by  the  MM-proposition [see  also  Cummins  and 
Sommer, (1996), and Miller, (1998)]. A fundamental assumption for this mechanism to work is that 
capital and financial securities are continuously traded in competitive markets. 
The  correspondence  of  capital  to  deposit  insurance  implies  that  the  hypothesis  of  perfect 
hedging can be formulated by imposing that every claim is assigned a unique insurance price in the 
market. Under such circumstances, managers are indifferent between hedging and insurance and are 
certainly indifferent about the amount of economic capital. 
However, hedging and insurance cannot be regarded as equivalent tools in practice. As a matter 
of  fact,  although  competitive  forces  in  capital  and  security  markets  may  lead  transactions  to  be 
produced at a unique price, this is scarcely the case of insurance markets, where non-standardised 
policies are transacted [see Goovaerts et al., (2005), and Venter, (1991)]. 
Liquidity restrictions may thereby arise from two different sources. In the first place, firms are 
not always able to trade continuously in capital and security markets. Then the moral-hazard arising 
due to the opaqueness of financial intermediaries induces the appearance of premiums over the market 
cost of capital, which should be established on an actuarial basis. Secondly, the buyers and sellers of 
insurance can maintain different perceptions about risks and can accordingly assign different prices to 
their corresponding guarantees. 
The optimal cash balance will be determined in this paper, in such a way that the market value 
of the firm, defined as the difference between the actuarial prices of equity and the default claim, plus 
the return offered by a non-risky bond, is maximised. 
A  precise  description  of  the  conditions  under  which  the  capital  structure  matters  will  be 
provided in this way. Hence the limits of the Modigliani and Miller invariance propositions will be 
clearly stated. 
 
3. The Optimal Capital Structure 
Both asset and liability claims will be regarded as random variables in the following, while the 
market value of net assets will be expressed as the product of the level of investment I and some 
random perturbations X: 
I
D A
X X I D A
−
= ⇒ ⋅ = −
                                                                              (3.1) 
Then the level of investment can be regarded as the principal of the net portfolio. The level of 
capital will be also represented as a proportion of the level of investment: 
I
K
k k I K = ⇒ ⋅ =
                 (3.2) 
The ratio k represents a capital-to-investment or a cash-to-risk ratio. It determines the proportion 
of internal financing of the firm. 
Every contract of deposit insurance obliges the guarantor to honour the total capital loss: 
( ) { } k X I k X I + ⋅ = + ⋅ − , 0 min                (3.3) 
in exchange of a certain premium paid by the former. Volume III_Issue3 (5)_Fall2008 
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Simultaneously, shareholders pay a certain price to managers at the beginning of the investment 
period, in exchange of receiving the following random capital profit at the end: 
( ) { } k X I k X I − ⋅ = − ⋅ + , 0 max               (3.4) 
The capital K is invested in a banking account to obtain the risk-free return  0 r  (or in other 
words, it is converted to a risk-free zero-coupon bond with internal return 0 r , promising to pay the cash 
flow  K r ⋅ 0  at some maturity date) [see Hull, (2000)]. 
The payments of the net portfolio at maturity are then given by: 
( ) k X if K r k X I ≥ ⋅ + − ⋅ 0  
( ) k X if K r k X I − ≤ ⋅ + + ⋅ 0  
k X k if < < − 0                 (3.5) 
Hence the firm can afford its debt and pay a surplus to shareholders when k X ≥ , i.e. the firm is 
solvent in this case. 
By contrast, when  k X − ≤  the capital K is deliver to the guarantor who has to afford the 
residual loss ( ) k X I + ⋅ . Shareholders receive nothing in this case. 
Finally, when  k X k < < −  the firm cannot return the total amount of capital to shareholders, 
although the total debt attracted from customers can be honoured and the guaranty is not invoked. 
Stockholders  might  decide  to  sell  their  shares  or  to  call  for  portfolio  restructuring  under  such 
circumstances. 
We have already pointed out that risk can be completely suppressed through hedging if cash and 
securities can be traded to any desired extent in the market. 
Indeed,  under  such  circumstances,  the  prices  (per  unit  of  investment)  of  the  contracts 
established with shareholders and guarantors are respectively given by the prices of a call and a put 
option on the value of the random capital return X with exercise price equal to the cash-to-risk ratio k, 
in such a way that the put-call parity can be invoked to obtain: 
( ) ( ) k X P e k k X C X
T r , ,
0 − ⋅ + =
⋅ −
              (3.6) 
where T denotes the time to maturity. Then the value of the firm does not depend on the cash-
to-risk ratio k, as established in the MM-proposition, as long as continuous rebalancing of portfolios is 
allowed [Merton, (1977), Cummins and Sommer, (1996), Miller, (1998)]. 
When hedging cannot be implemented to any extent due to liquidity restrictions, the prices of 
the contracts established with stockholders and guarantors should be determined on an actuarial basis. 
Accordingly, the price of equity and the price of insurance (equal to the cost of bankruptcy) 
must be respectively corresponded to the following terms: 
( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ∫
∞ +
+ + ⋅ − = −
k X x dF k x k X E  
( ) ( ) ∫
∞ +
+ ⋅ − =
k X dx x f k x   (3.7) 
( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ∫
−
∞ − − ⋅ + − = +
k
X x dF k x k X E  
( ) ( ) ∫
−
∞ − ⋅ + − =
k
X dx x f k x                 (3.8) 
for these terms represent the actuarial prices of the corresponding underlying exposures [see 
Goovaerts et al., (1984)]. 
In Eq. (3.7) and (3.8), the terms  X F  and  X f  respectively denote the cumulative and density 
probability distributions, respectively defined as [see, for example, De Finetti, (1975)]: 
( ) { } x X P x FX ≤ =                   (3.9) 
( ) { } ( )
dx
x dF
x X P x f
X
X = = =
                (3.10) Journal of Applied Economic Sciences 
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Then the value of the firm at the end of the investment period (as perceived by managers) is 
given by: 
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] ( ) K r I k X E k X E V ⋅ + ⋅ + − − = − + 0             (3.11) 
Within this context, the cash-to-risk ratio k affects the net return on investment and hence the 
value of the firm. 
Given any fixed level of investment I, every rational manager must choose the capital structure 
that maximises the firm's value per unit of investment V/I. From Eqs. (3.1), (3.2), (3.3), (3.4), (3.7), 
(3.8) and (3.11) we obtain that every rational manager must then solve the following maximisation 
problem: 
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] k r k X E k X E
k ⋅ + + − − − + 0 max
            (3.12) 
An  alternative  model  that  characterises  the  optimal  capital  structure  in  terms  of  the  values 
( ) [ ] + −k X E  and  ( ) [ ] − +k X E  is suggested by Froot et al., (1993). In that model, the market value of 
the portfolio depends on some absolute perturbation X, and not a relative perturbation, as it is the case 
in the model presented in this paper, see Eq. (3.1). 
The  solution  to  the  maximisation  problem  (3.12)  can  be  determined  by  applying  Lagrange 
optimisation. The first-order condition actually leads to: 
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ]












            (3.13) 
As noticed from Eqs. (3.7) and (3.8), the derivation of the terms  ( ) [ ] + −k X E  and  ( ) [ ] − +k X E  
implies  the  derivation  of  integral  operators  with  respect  to  a  variable  that  affects  the  limits  of 
integration. The Leibnitz’s rule can then be applied: 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )

























            (3.14) 
From Eqs. (3.7) and (3.14) we obtain that: 
( ) [ ] ( )













            (3.15) 
where the function  X X F T − =1  denotes the tail or survival probability distribution. 
Besides, since  { } { } k X P k X P > − = − ≤ , we obtain from Eqs. (3.8) and (3.14) that: 
( ) [ ] ( )













− ∫             (3.16) 
From Eqs. (3.13), (3.15) and (3.16) we finally arrive to the following expression for the first-
order condition of the maximisation problem of Eq. (3.12): 
( ) ( )
∗ ∗
− = + k T r k T X X 0                   (3.17) 
which can be equivalently established in terms of the cumulative probability functions: 
( ) ( )
∗ ∗
− − = + − k F r k F X X 1 1 0                 (3.18) 
Therefore, the optimal cash balance is determined at the point where the marginal reduction in 
the excess of cash over the level of capital, determined in Eq. (3.15), equals the marginal return on 
investment, represented by the term of Eq. (3.16), plus the risk-free interest rate 0 r . 
The existence of a solution to the maximisation problem (3.12) can be mathematically assured 
as long as the related objective function is concave, or in other words, as long as the second derivative 
of the objective function is lower than zero, i.e. as long as: Volume III_Issue3 (5)_Fall2008 
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k X E d
dk
k X E d
              (3.19) 
From Eqs. (3.15) and (3.16), this condition is equivalent to: 




k dT X X
∗ ∗
− <                   (3.20) 
which from Eq. (3.10) and since  X X F T − =1 , can be still rewritten as: 
{ } { }
∗ ∗ − = < = k X P k X P                 (3.21) 
We thus arrive to the (reasonable) conclusion that capital is beneficial to financial institutions 
only  when  the  probability  of  attaining  a  capital  loss  of  a  certain  magnitude  is  greater  than  the 
probability of obtaining a capital gain of the same magnitude. 
In particular, every symmetrical probability distribution (around its expected value) satisfies: 
[ ] { } [ ] { } x x X E X P x X E X P ∀ + = = − =             (3.22) 
Hence,  within  the  class  of  risks  characterised  by  symmetrical  probability  distributions,  the 
objective function of the maximisation problem of Eq. (3.12) is concave when [ ] 0 < X E , but convex 
when  [ ] 0 > X E . Accordingly, a maximum exists in this case only when [ ] 0 < X E . In other words, 
capital is beneficial for this kind of financial institutions only when [ ] 0 < X E . 
 
4. The Cost of Capital of Opaque Intermediaries 
As demonstrated in the previous section, in the presence of liquidity restrictions, the market 
value of financial institutions, as determined by Eq. (3.11), may well be affected by the proportion of 
internal finance k ─ and hence by the underlying capital structure. 
Liquidity  restrictions  arise,  in  the  first  place,  because  the  portion  of  capital  provided  by 
stockholders  is  determined  in  a  regular  frequency  and  cannot  be  modified  until  the  end  of  the 
investment period. As a matter of fact, the amount of equity and the frequency of revisions are the 
result of negotiations between managers and stockholders. Changing such agreements is necessarily 
costly − and can reduce the market valorisation of the firm.  
On the other hand, choosing regulatory and risk-based capital principles implies that the amount 
of economic capital must be subject to constant revisions, as long as the risk ness of the net-assets' 
portfolio is varying − i.e. as long as the series of capital profits and losses of the net-assets' portfolio is 
non-stationary. This means that managers are obliged to rely on some market of cash balances (or 
inter-bank loans) in order to maintain a total level of capital that is consistent with the underlying 
exposure. 
Although preferring external debt reduces the controls imposed by shareholders, this strategy 
also raises the costs associated to moral-hazard (on the side of customers) and bankruptcy. This is 
especially true in highly leveraged firms, where managers have strong incentives to take risk [see 
Jensen, (1986)]. 
Consequently, when deciding their capital structures, firms have to face a trade off between 
paying high  spreads because of opaqueness and  signalling  costs on the one  hand, and  sacrificing 
potential competitive advantages when maintaining idle balances on the other [see also Fama, (1980), 
and Ross, (1989)]. 
Another kind of liquidity restrictions thereby arises due to the fact that the opportunity cost of 
capital, that is perceived by managers as the reduction in the price of equity induced when certain level 
of capital is maintained, is not necessarily equal to the return r they have to pay to borrow in the 
market of cash balances, since in general: 








                (4.1) 
Indeed, while the cost of equity reflects the agency costs between managers and stockholders, 
the  market  capital  cost  r  is  determined  according  to  the  capacity  and  willingness  to  pay  of  the 
borrower  and  it  then  reflects  the  moral-hazard  in  the  relationship  with  customers.  It  depends,  in 
particular, on the capital structure of the borrower institution. Journal of Applied Economic Sciences 
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When determining the price of loans, the creditors of opaque organisations rely on their own 
research  and  monitoring,  as  well  as  on  the  information  published  in  the  media  and  the  risk 
categorisations provided by specialised (private and governmental) institutions. 
The credit ratings observed in practice normally include a finite number of categories. Within 
each class, every firm is supposed to face the same risk of default and hence every firm is allowed to 
borrow at the same interest rate, in such a way that the more the concerns of creditors about the credit 
capacity of firms in a certain class, the higher the level of the corresponding cost of capital and vice-
versa. 
This means that lenders cannot discriminate perfectly and that borrowers can remain in the same 
class as long as they do not drastically modify their capital structures. In other words, as long as firms 
do not drastically vary their cash-to-risk ratios, they can regard the market capital cost as a constant. 
Let us consider in the following some firm that belongs to a certain class determined by the 
capital cost r and maintains the cash-to-risk ratio k. 
The cost of equity of this kind of firms is given by: 
( ) [ ] [ ] k r X E k X E ⋅ − = − + +                 (4.2) 
This  means  that  the  external  and  internal  financing  alternatives  of  the  firm,  respectively 
characterised by the return r and the difference in the price of equity when including the stock of 
capital k, are at equilibrium only when: 
[ ] ( ) [ ]
r
k
k X E X E
=
− − + +                 (4.3) 
A capital profit and loss is then expected to be produced, due to differences between the internal 
and external estimations of the cost of capital, since in general we expect that: 






k X E X E
              (4.4) 
Accordingly, external funding is regarded as expensive by those firms that obtain 0 < ∆ , for in 
this case maintaining the cash-to-risk ratio k produces a loss that is lower than the alternative cost of 
borrowing the same balance in the market. These firms prefer to demand reserves instead of relying on 
external finance. 
Conversely, external finance is cheap for those firms that obtain 0 > ∆ , for they have to incur in 
a higher loss when they choose to maintain a stock of capital. These firms prefer to demand no capital 
at all. 
Jensen (1986) has noticed that internal monitoring is more intense when positive balances are 
obtained at the end of the investment period and cash is at disposal in excess of what is required to 
fund every ongoing (solvent) investment project. In this case, which can be actually corresponded to 
the condition 0 > ∆ , it is said that a firm owns free-cash-flow. 
In the model of Jensen (1986), frictions and mismanagement are specially severe within firms 
disposing of high amounts of free-cash-flow, resulting from the competition, between managers and 
shareholders, to take control of the profits generated by the company. 
Since  competition  in  product  and  factor  markets  should  push  utilities  to  a  minimum  level 
(eventually  to  zero),  only  those  activities  generating  substantial  economic  rents  are  supposed  to 
generate substantial amounts of free cash flow. Such activities are corresponded to product and factor 
markets where market forces are weak and where monitoring is more important than ever. 
In  conclusion,  short-term  stickiness  inherent  in  the  equity  contracts  established  with 
stockholders, as well as in the credit categorisations determined by lenders in the markets of cash 
balances, may prevent financial institutions from continuously adjusting their capital structures. 
Thus, on the one hand, changing the amount of equity implies a redistribution of the cash flow 
at disposal inside the institution that may increase the agency costs implicit in the relationship between 
managers and stockholders (as stated by Jensen) and which can be explicitly measured in terms of the 
actuarial price of the excess claim  k X − . 
On the other hand, raising the amount of external debt may raise the bankruptcy costs faced by 
institutions and the moral-hazard inherent in their relationship with creditors. These adjustments are Volume III_Issue3 (5)_Fall2008 
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performed through adjustments in the cost of capital r ─ or in other words, in the risk categorisations 
of the lender institutions. 
 
5. Economic Capital as the Optimal Deductible 
An optimal capital principle can be derived, based on an optimal compromise of bankruptcy 
costs and the market price of external debt. 
Indeed, first notice that replacing Eq. (4.2) in Eq. (3.11) we obtain that the value, per unit of 
investment, of those firms that can borrow at the interest rate r is equal to: 
[ ] ( ) [ ] ( ) k r r k X E X E
I
V
⋅ − − + − = − + 0               (5.1) 
Maximising value is then equivalent to minimise the total burden of default, equal to the price 
of insurance, represented by the term ( ) [ ] − +k X E , plus the net benefit obtained when investing capital 
at the interest rate r instead of maintaining it at the low (non-risky) rate 0 r : 
( ) [ ] ( ) k r r k X E
k ⋅ − + + − 0 min                 (5.2) 
This problem has been  already used to derive a rule of capital allocation by  Dhaene  et al. 
(2003), Laeven and Goovaerts (2004) and also Goovaerts et al. (2005). They regard its solution as an 
optimal solvency margin, which establishes a compromise between the costs of capital on the one 
hand, and a solvency requirement on the other. When justifying the implementation of this rule, they 
emphasise that arbitrage opportunities are difficult to exploit in insurance markets. 
The first-order condition of the minimisation problem (5.2) leads to: 
( ) [ ]






                (5.3) 
which from Eq. (3.16) can be rewritten as: 
( ) 0 0 = − + −
∗
− r r k T X                   (5.4) 
Besides, since: 
( ) [ ] ( ) ( )





k X E d
X
X






              (5.5) 
we obtain that the objective function of the minimisation problem (5.2) is always convex, and 
hence, this function always attains a minimum. 
More specifically, as long as the marginal benefit of adding the first unit of capital is greater 
than the net investment premium, i.e. as long as: 
( ) 0 0 r r T X − > −                     (5.6) 
and as long as some capital loss is produced with non-zero probability, a range exists where the 
term  ( ) [ ] − +k X E  is convex in k. In this case, a level of capital exists that minimises the criterion of 
Eq. (5.2). 
Under such circumstances, the optimal capital demand is determined by the quantile function of 
the probability distribution of the series of capital profit and losses of the underlying risk: 
( ) ( ) 0
1
0





∗               (5.7) 
or equivalently, in terms of the liquidity premium  0 r r − = ν : 







X X F T k                 (5.8) 
In  other  words,  the  optimal  surplus  is  expressed  as  the  Value-at-Risk  (or  VaR)  for  the 
confidence probability level  0 r r − = ν  (the definition and interpretation of the Value-at-Risk can be 
found in [Hull, (2000)]). 
The VaR has been recommended for the implementation of good risk management practices by 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004). Journal of Applied Economic Sciences 
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The fact that the confidence level in the definition of VaR is replaced by a net premium in Eq. 
(5.7) is a consequence of the first-order condition, which determines an exchange between a sure flow 
and a flow of probability ─ as specified in Eqs. (3.17), (3.18) and (5.4). 
Accordingly, the higher the liquidity premium ν  (i.e. the more the free-cash-flow at disposal), 
the more expensive to maintain a cash balance and hence the less the capital demanded. Conversely, 
the lower the liquidity premium, the cheaper the capital and hence the more the quantity demanded of 
this  resource.  The  minimum  and  the  maximum  levels  are  respectively  chosen  when  1 ≥ ν   and 
when 0 ≤ ν . 
From the actuarial viewpoint, the expected excess loss  ( ) [ ] − +k X E  represents the fair price of 
a special insuring contract (sometimes called layer) that obliges the insurer to pay to the policyholder 
the excess of loss over the level k, when such a loss is produced [see Goovaerts, (1984)]. 
In this context, the amount k represents a guarantee provided by the policyholder in order to 
assure the insurer (up to some extent) that every reasonable care will be taken to reduce the underlying 
exposure.  In  other  words,  the  guarantee  k,  which  is  known  as  the  deductible  or  retention  in  the 
literature, is introduced in insurance contracts as a means of reducing the costs derived from moral-
hazard. 
Within this framework, the optimal level of capital corresponds to the optimal deductible or the 
optimal retention of the related insuring liability contract. 
Notice that full-coverage is implicitly assumed in the model, because the actuarial prices of 
equity  and  insurance  have  been  expressed  in  terms  of  mathematical  expectations  that  consider 
unlimited losses and gains over the level of capital. However, insurance contracts always specify a 
maximum  payment in  practice. The question then arises of who does  eventually bear the risk of 
deposits. 
According to the terms of the guaranteeing contracts previously defined, we can say that risk-
bearing is roughly distributed in the following way: any loss up to the retention level k is paid by the 
firm (recall that shareholders only endure the equity component of the economic capital); losses that 
are higher than the retention level are paid by the guarantor or insurer, as long as these losses do not 
surpasses a maximum disaster level 
DIS M ; finally, some companies can seek for additional protection 
by establishing a contract with some reinsurance institution that agrees to pay any loss greater than the 
disaster level 
DIS M , but lower than some catastrophe level 
CAT M . 
Hence, in the case of catastrophic events, it is the society as a whole who has to afford the losses 
─ through governmental divisions, private creditors, companies and householders. This explains why 
it is in the interest of regulators to define good practices and regulatory requirements that can induce 
financial intermediaries to seek for protection according to the risk they actually bear. 
From the  economic point of view,  the  existence  of  an optimal level  of  capital  implies  that 
choosing a different level necessarily leads to over- or under-investment. 
Indeed, idle money (which could be used to fund profitable investments) is maintained in excess 
when more capital than the optimal level is demanded. By contrast, when the stock of capital is lower 
than the optimal level, risk is taken in excess, a fact that might eventually increase the frequency of 
losses (as well as disaster and catastrophic events) and induce investors to raise their concerns about 
the credit quality of the firm. The price at which the firm can attract debt in the market might increase 
under such circumstances.  
Therefore, independently of whether managers consider or not any of the optimisation problems 
presented in this paper, their capital preferences should approach to the solutions of these problems, 
for  only  following  this  strategy  the  market  value  of  firms  can  be  maximised  (or  the  burden  of 
bankruptcy can be minimised). 
On these grounds, the optimal capital principle provides a basis for the determination of the 
aggregate  behaviour  of  markets  or  multidivisional  corporations  (I  analyse  the  problem  of  the 
allocation of capital inside multibusinesses corporations in Mierzejewski, 2006). 
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6. The Optimal Gaussian Capital Principle 
When the underlying exposure X follows a Gaussian probability distribution with mean  µ  and 
volatility σ  the optimal capital principle, as defined in Equation (5.8), takes the form: 
( ) ( ) µ ν σ ν − − Φ ⋅ =
− 1
1 k                 (6.1) 
where ν  denotes the liquidity premium and Φ denotes the cumulative probability function of a 
standard Gaussian probability distribution, whose mean and volatility are respectively equal to zero 
and one, and which is defined as (see De Finetti, 1975): 


















              (6.2) 
Then the optimal Gaussian capital principle follows a straight line in the plane of cash-to-risk 
ratios and volatilities see Figure (6.1). 
Also the option-based capital rule of Robert Merton shows a linear dependence on volatility. 
Indeed, as stated by Merton and Perold (1993) the formula of risk capital, per unit invested on 
net assets, can be approximated by the expression: 
T k
MP σ ⋅ = 4 . 0                   (6.3) 
where T denotes the time to maturity of the related option contract. This relationship is depicted 
in Fig. (6.1) as well, assuming the value 1 = T . 
Therefore, while the capital principle of Merton intersects the capitals axe at the origin and have 
a constant slope (equal to 0.4), the optimal principle of Eq. (6.1) intersects the capital axe at the value 













































Figure 1: The Optimal Capital Line and the allocation rule proposed by Merton and Perold (1993). 
 
This means, in particular, that at low volatilities those firms that obtain capital profits in average 
(characterised by 0 > µ ) prefer to lend all their balances and do not maintain reserves at all. In fact, 
they only demand capital when: 
( ) ( ) ν
µ
σ µ ν σ
− Φ




1             (6.4) 
The point at which firms maintains a balance equal to zero, as predicted by the MM-proposition, 







1                    (6.5) 
By contrast, those firms that obtain capital losses in average (characterised by 0 < µ ) always 
prefer to maintain some stock of reserves. According to the optimal capital principle, such stock is Journal of Applied Economic Sciences 
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equal to the absolute value of the mean loss of net assets plus a term depending on the underlying 
volatility and the liquidity premium. 
Therefore, the optimal capital principle determines an optimal capital line in the Gaussian case, 
which relates the optimal proportion of reserves in terms of the mean return and the volatility of the 























Liquidity Premium  
 
Figure 2: Implied Slope of the Optimal Capital Line in terms of the Liquidity Premium. 
 
In fact, lower liquidity premiums are corresponded to markets where firms hold less cash in 
excess and are thereby willing to exchange more capital for every unit of increased volatility. Hence, 
as depicted in Figure 2, the slope of the optimal capital line is higher in such markets. 
In particular, the slope tends to  ∞ +  when 0 → ν , i.e. the capital line becomes vertical in this 
case. Hence the willingness to exchange balances for volatility can be regarded as unbounded in such 

















































Figure 3: The Optimal Capital Line with negative slope. 
 
Notice,  however,  still  from  Figure  2,  that  the  slope  of  the  capital  line  turns  negative 
when 5 . 0 > ν .  Accordingly,  and  contrary  to  the  common  intuition,  the  capital  requirements  may 
decrease with the level of volatility if the liquidity premium is sufficiently high. 
This implies that when  5 . 0 > ν  firms eventually prefer to lend all their balances, once the 
underlying volatility surpasses  a certain level determined by the expected return and the liquidity 
premium. Consequently, as depicted in Figure 3, the capital line takes negative values after some level 
of volatility is surpassed. 
Finally,  the  Merton's  principle  can  be  obtained  as  a  particular  case  of  the  optimal  capital 
principle. Indeed, the rule of Eq. (6.3) can be obtained from Eq. (6.1) by replacing in Eq. (6.1) the 
values  0 = µ  and  % 25 . 34 ≈ ν  (in such a way that ( ) 4 . 0 1
1 ≈ − Φ
− ν ). See Figure 4. Volume III_Issue3 (5)_Fall2008 
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This situation can be naturally corresponded to a competitive environment, where firms obtain 
no capital profits in average (as long as 0 = µ ) and the liquidity premium is sufficiently high (around 















































Figure 4: The Capital Rule of Robert Merton as a particular case of the Optimal Capital Principle. 
 
Recall that the optimal capital principle, as defined according to Eqs. (5.7), (5.8) or (6.1), has 
been already obtained as an extension of the option-based Merton's principle. Thus, both principles 
relate the demand for capital to a demand for deposit insurance, in such a way that in both cases the 
maturity payments of the underlying net portfolio are described by Eq. (3.5). The difference relies on 
the fact that while in the model of Merton the underlying contingent claims are measured by the 
market prices of their corresponding call and put options, in the model of optimal capital proposed in 
this paper the same claims are assigned their actuarial prices. 
We can then conclude that the Gaussian capital principle satisfactorily extends the model of 
capital proposed by Robert Merton ─ or equivalently, the principle satisfactorily extends the MM-
proposition. The optimal capital principle is thereby meaningful from the economic point of view. 
 
7. The Optimal Capital Principle with Heavy Tails 
An appealing feature of the capital principle defined in Eqs. (5.7) and (5.8) is its adaptability to 
any family of probability distributions. 
As a consequence, the capital requirements of different types of risks can be described on the 
same basis and hence, the model can be also implemented in institutions that hold securities exposed 
to non-homogeneous risks. This is particularly the case of insurance companies that simultaneously 
deal with highly standardised policies,  such as car and fire insurance, as well as some individual 
contracts involving payments depending on events of low probability. 
This  is  also  the  case  of  some  financial  conglomerates  that  simultaneously  hold  standard 
financial securities, transacted in highly liquid markets, as well as non-liquid derivatives and claims 
contingent on disaster and catastrophic events. 
Two  probability  distributions  that  have  raised  a  lot  of  attention  in  the  Risk  Management 
literature are the  Exponential  and the Paretian  distributions, because  they  provide  a mathematical 
description of the phenomenon of heavy tails. 
Indeed, let the functions 
EXP T  and
PAR T , defined below, respectively denote the tail probability 
functions of Exponential and Paretian random variables: 
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1                (7.3) 
Then  the  probability  accumulated  in  the  tails  of  Paretian  risks  is  always  greater  than  the 
probability accumulated in the tails of Exponential risks, which in turn is always greater than the 
probability accumulated in the tails of Gaussian risks: 
( ) ( ) ( ) x x T x T x T
GAU EXP PAR ∀ > >               (7.4) 
It is accordingly stated that Paretian tails are uniformly greater or heavier than Exponential tails, 
which in turn are uniformly greater or heavier than Gaussian tails. 
In  the  actuarial  literature,  the  condition  (7.4)  determines  an  order  over  a  class  of  random 
variables  that  is  known  as  the  first  stochastic  order;  see  Goovaerts  et  al.,  1984.  In  other  words, 
condition (7.4) implies that Gaussian risks are  stochastically dominated by Exponential risks, and 
Exponential risks are stochastically dominated by Paretian risks. 
From Eqs. (5.7), (7.1) and (7.2), the optimal capital principle under Paretian and Exponential 
risks is respectively given by: 
( ) ( ) ν β ν ln ⋅ − = C k
EXP                  (7.5) 
( )
α ν ν ⋅ = B k
PAR                   (7.6) 
The Gaussian capital principle ( ) ν




































Figure 5: The Optimal Capital Principle for different risk parameterisations. 
 
Consequently, as depicted in Figure 5, given any level of the liquidity premium, the Paretian 
capital principle is always  greater  than  the  Exponential  capital  principle, which in turn is  always 
greater than the Gaussian capital principle. 
Therefore, the optimal capital principle consistently assigns higher surpluses to riskier claims 
and hence, it is strictly risk-based. 
 
8. Concluding Remarks 
Firms that continuously trade capital and securities demand no cash reserves, for they can fit 
their balances at any moment through borrowing and lending [Modigliani and Miller, (1958)]. 
In fact, as proved by Merton (1974, 1977, 1997), although the market prices of equity and 
deposit insurance (which are the main components of the capital structure) actually depend on the 
level of reserves, the value of firms does not depend on it [see also Miller, (1998)]. This result is a 
consequence of the fact that continuous hedging suppresses risk. 
However, when firms face restrictions on liquidity (in other words, when borrowing and lending 
may change the price of capital if the transacted amounts break on through certain thresholds) the 
capital  structure  determines  the  agency  costs  and  the  moral-hazard  implicit  in  the  contracts  that 
managers respectively establish with stockholders and customers [Jensen, (1986), Froot et al., (1993)]. 
Hence the market prices of equity and deposit insurance should be determined on an actuarial 
basis. As demonstrated in this paper, an optimal cash balance then exists, which leads to an optimal Volume III_Issue3 (5)_Fall2008 
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capital principle that is consistent with economic fundamentals and is easy to implement for a wide 
class of probability distributions. 
Moreover, since the level of capital is explicitly related to the deductible or retention of the 
corresponding insurance contract, it explicitly represents the moral-hazard on the side of customers. 
In particular, when the underlying risk follows a Gaussian probability distribution, a capital line 
is obtained relating the optimal proportion of capital to the standard deviation. This principle naturally 
extends the capital allocation rule proposed by Merton and Perold (1993). 
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